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ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini menguji pengaruh krisis keuangan di Asia terhadap prilaku saham di 
Bursa Efek Jakarta (BEJ). Secara spesifik tujuan penelitian ini adalah, pertama melihat 
perubahan likuiditas, aktivitas perdagangan, dan volatilitas return saham di BEJ dari 
periode sebelum krisis keuangan. Kedua, menguji stabilitas variabel-variabel yang 
menetukan likuiditas saham di BEJ ketika terjadi krisis keuangan. 
Penelitian ini menggunakan paired t-tests, non-parametric sign tests, dan analisis 
regresi untuk menguji dampak krisis keuangan. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa bid-
ask spread, depth, aktivitas perdagangan, dan volatilitas meningkat signifikan selama 
krisis. Hasil keseluruhan menunjukkan bahwa krisis keuangan meningkatkan biaya 
transaksi investor kecil dan investor yang mengalami panik. Hasil penelitian juga 
menunjukkan penentu spread dan depth adalah harga, volume, dan volatilitas. Namun 
variabel penentu ini tidak stabil dari periode sebelum dan selama krisis keuangan, 
pengecualian untuk harga saham. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Asian crisis began in the middle of 
1997 with the devaluation of the Thai bath 
followed by currency collapse in Indonesia and 
other Asian countries. In Indonesia, some 
economic indicators showed a dramatic 
downward movement following the start of the 
financial crisis. The growth rate of Indonesia’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreased 
from 7.98 percent in 1996 to –13.7 percent in 
1998. The level of inflation increased from 
6.47 percent in 1996 to 77.63 percent in 1998. 
The exchange rate (Rupiah (IDR) per US$) 
deteriorated from 2,383 in 1996 to 8,025 in 
1998. The SBI increased from 12.26 percent in 
1996 to 37.84 percent in 1998. One-month 
time deposits increased from 16.92 percent 
annually in 1996 to 41.42 percent in 1998.  
All of these factors would surely have 
negative impacts on the Indonesian capital 
market. The Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) 
Composite Index decreased by 37 percent at 
the end of 1997 and continued decreasing in 
1998.  
Intuitively, the financial crisis might affect 
the stocks’ performance negatively, i.e., 
liquidity, trading activity, and volatility. 
Investors might see that the capital market was 
not an interesting alternative available to 
invest, causing investors to reallocate their 
wealth to more attractive investment 
alternatives. Domestic and foreign investors 
suddenly lost confidence, thereby liquidating 
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their holding of stocks, and perhaps moving 
their capitals to the United States and other 
safer countries (Higgins and Klitgaard, 2000). 
Thus, the financial crisis could lead to lower 
liquidity and lower trading activity. Moreover, 
the panic in the capital market might hurt 
investors’ ability to estimate the fundamental 
value of the listed stocks. Consequently, the 
stock prices were becoming highly volatile. 
Liquidity, trading activity, and volatility 
are important features of capital markets. A 
better understanding of their changes may 
increase the credence of capital markets, 
investors, and listed companies. It must also be 
noted that many previous researches have 
documented that liquidity was associated with 
stock prices, trading activity, and returns’ 
volatility. Hence, previous researches have 
provided empirical evidences in the different 
markets (Stoll, 1978; McInish & Wood, 1992; 
Aitken & Frino, 1996). 
Research Objectives 
Despite of the importance of research in 
stocks’ behaviors, this study makes a first-pass 
attempt to providing an analysis of the impact 
of Indonesian financial crisis on JSX 
performance.
2
 There are two objectives of this 
research that have been yet satisfactorily 
studied, e.g.: 
1. To highlight the changes in liquidity, 
trading activity, and returns’ volatility of 
stocks in JSX from periods before to during 
the financial crisis.  
2. To examine the stability of the 
determinants of stocks’ liquidity in JSX 
due to the presence of the financial crisis. 
                                                          
2
 Wang (2000) studied the impact of trade by foreign 
investors on market (JSX Composite Index) volatility, 
conditioning by financial crisis in Indonesia. Otchere 
and Chan (2000) examined the short-run overreaction 
hypothesis on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange using 
data from March 1996 to June 1998. Although their 
study periods encompassed the pre- and during Asian 
financial crisis periods, the concerns of both studies 
were not on the impact of the financial crisis. 
THE BRIEF HISTORICAL BEHAVIOR 
OF JAKARTA STOCK EXCHANGE 
LISTED STOCKS (1993 – 1998) 
Table 1 shows briefly the US$ rate and the 
JSX Composite Index from 1993 to 1998. As 
the table makes obvious, the available history 
of Indonesian equities can be divided into two 
distinct periods. From 1993 through second 
quarter of 1997, there was an up market 
movement in the Indonesian capital market. 
After the middle of 1997, the trend was 
reversed, a downward market movement 
prevailed. 
 
Table 1. The Jakarta Composite Index and the 
Rupiah/US$ Exchange Rate 
 
Year (Quarter) US$ Rate 
Composite 
Index 
 1993 2110 588.765 
 1994 2200 469.640 
 1995 2307 513.847 
 1996 2382 637.432 
1997 (q1) 2418 662.236 
1997 (q2) 2450 724.556 
1997 (q3) 3275 546.688 
1997 (q4) 4650 401.712 
1998 (q1) 8750 541.425 
1998 (q2) 14900 445.920 
1998 (q3) 10850 276.150 
1998 (q4) 8068 398.038 
 
US$ rate was relatively constant in the 
period from 1993 to the middle of 1997. It 
ranged from Rp2,100/$ to Rp2,500/$. There 
were no apparent fluctuations in the US$ rate. 
Even the pattern of the JSX Composite Index 
showed an increasing trend and achieved the 
highest level in the second quarter of 1997. 
Clearly, the Indonesian stock market 
experienced a bull run in the period from 1993 
through the middle of 1997.  
The Indonesian crisis began and collapsed 
the JSX in the middle of 1997. Indonesian 
stock market experienced a dramatic change 
following that event. The rupiah’s value had 
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declined fast against dollar and achieved the 
extreme rate in the second quarter of 1998. The 
JSX Composite Index also showed a similar 
phenomenon. The index level declined below 
500, i.e., the psychological limit believed by 
many participants in Indonesian capital market. 
Unanimously, the JSX experienced a bear run 
in the period from the middle of 1997 to the 
end of 1998. 
Trading Characteristics in the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange 
The JSX is the primary exchange operating 
in Indonesia. As of the second quarter of 1997, 
265 companies were listed on the exchange 
with a market capitalization of roughly 
US$100 billion.  
The JSX operates using the Automated 
Trading System (ATS) that has been 
implemented since May 22, 1995. The JSX 
trading system is based on an order driven 
market, where the market is made up of bids 
and asks entered continuously by exchange 
members. There are no exchange-designated 
market makers that act like specialists in New 
York Stock Exchange or multiple market 
makers in NASDAQ. Investors who want to 
trade have to contact a brokerage company, 
who is member of the exchange. Brokerage 
companies buy and sell securities on the floor 
based on orders from investors, but they may 
also trade in their own names. 
Prices resulting from orders and the 
continuous auction market form the basis of 
the regular board. The regular board is then 
used to calculate the JSX Composite Index. 
There are still some negotiated boards for 
trades, where prices are determined by 
negotiation between buyers and sellers, which 
do not compete with the regular board. 
Transaction on the regular board is the largest, 
representing 80.26 percent of shares volume, 
77.87 percent of trading value, and 97.22 
percent of trading frequency in 1998.  
Orders placed on the regular board are 
matched according to price and time priority. 
Orders may be amended or withdrawn prior to 
execution, but only limit orders may be 
entered. Typically, orders expire at the end of 
each exchange day. During the period of the 
study, the minimum price variation (tick size) 
for JSX’s stocks was Rp25. To improve the 
market performance, JSX decreased its tick 
size on July 3, 2000. Such study is our concern 
in another research (Tandelilin & Purwoto, 
2001). 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section presents a possible explanation 
of the impact of the financial crisis on 
liquidity. It also discusses the relationship 
among liquidity, trading activity, stock prices, 
and returns’ volatility documented in the 
previous studies. 
Apart from the financial crisis, this 
research also deals with the market liquidity, 
so we need a definition of that concept. In 
principle, liquidity refers to how quickly and 
how cheaply investors can trade an asset when 
they want to. Many researchers of liquidity-
related studies commonly use bid-ask spread 
(the difference between ask price and bid 
price) as the indicator of liquidity. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1998) showed that an important 
component of liquidity was the spread between 
the bid and ask prices at which dealers were 
willing to satisfy sellers’ and buyers’ demand 
for immediate execution of their transactions. 
Trading at the quoted bid and ask prices saves 
traders from any associated delays and 
difficulties, but at a cost. Thus, lower spread 
means higher liquidity. 
The effect of the financial crisis on bid-ask 
spread might have a rational guide shown by 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001). It 
follows the inventory paradigm (for instance, 
Stoll, 1978) that suggested that transaction cost 
(spread) depended on the costs of financing 
dealer inventories, on factors that influence the 
risk of holding inventories, and on extreme 
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events that provoke order imbalances and 
thereby causing inventory overload. The 
paradigm suggests that inventory accumulation 
concern is more important in down markets. A 
down market may be characterized by frenzied 
selling (in contrast to steady buying in rising 
markets), so inventory problem can be accu-
mulated to dealers. Dealers must capture 
strongly the inventory cost in down market 
movement. Thus, spread usually increases in 
down markets. On the other hand, rising 
markets attract more investors, thus increasing 
liquidity. 
Market microstructure literatures have long 
revealed the determinants of spread and depth. 
Stoll (1978) and McInish and Wood (1992) 
studied the determinants of spread in the US 
market, and suggested that there were three 
fundamental variables used in cross-section 
modeling of dealer spread: (1) stock prices, (2) 
trading activity, and (3) volatility. These 
determinants of spread were also found in 
different market structures where the market 
makers were not present (Aitken and Frino 
1996). 
The following briefly summarizes the 
previous researches on the explanatory 
variables of spread: 
1. Trading activity was negatively related to 
spread, since limit orders of thinner stocks 
had a lower probability of execution. 
Accordingly, market participants were less 
likely to submit limit orders, hence 
reducing the downward pressure on spread. 
2. Spread tended to be high in high volatility 
because high volatility hurt the liquidity 
suppliers. 
3. The absolute spread increased with the 
price level to balance the execution cost. 
However, the percentage spread was 
inversely related to price level subsequent 
to the minimum tick rule.  
However, liquidity is a complex term. 
Literatures also note that overall liquidity 
should include not only the price dimension 
(spread) but also the quantity dimension 
(market depth, i.e., the number of shares that 
can be traded at given bid and ask quotes) 
(Madhavan, 1992). More depth implies 
increases liquidity as it means a larger ability 
to accept orders flow without large changes in 
price. 
Also, the association among depth and 
those three explanatory variables is known to 
be in the opposite direction of the absolute 
spread. This is possible because a natural 
relation exists between spread and depth. As a 
rule, the greater the spread, the greater the 
depth since traders will desire to sell more at a 
higher price and buy at a lower price (Harris, 
1997). 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Data 
This study utilizes daily data from the List 
of Securities’ Quotations published by the 
JSX. The list contains trades in the regular 
board and includes a stock’s code, name, 
closing prices, trading frequency, volume in 
shares, volume in rupiah, and price and 
number of shares at the best closing quote.  
Sampling 
The sampling period is chosen from the 
beginning of 1996 to the end of 1998, covering 
the Indonesian financial crisis. Among all 
common stocks listed in the beginning of 
1996, this study excludes stocks delisted 
during the sampling period.  
The sampling period is then divided into 
two sub periods of approximately equal length: 
(1) the period of before (1996) and (2) during 
the financial crisis (1998). The period of 1997 
is eliminated from the analysis and treated as a 
gray area due to the beginning of the crisis. 
The period of 1996 consists of 253 trading 
days and the period of 1998 comprises 288 
trading days.  
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This categorization of the both periods 
(before and during the crisis) is comparable to 
other studies of the Asian crisis. Otchere and 
Chan (2000) defined the first period consisting 
of 336 trading days from March 25, 1996 to 
July 31, 1997. The second period comprises 
224 trading days and coincides with the Asian 
financial crisis period from August 1, 1997 to 
June 30, 1998. Wang (2000) distinguished the 
period before and after the Indonesian financial 
crisis as from January 1, 1996 to August 3, 
1997 (390 trading days) and from August 4, 
1997 to October 10, 1998 (290 trading days). 
Variables and Measures 
1. Liquidity 
Liquidity is operationalized by using two 
metrics: (1) bid-ask spread and (2) market 
depth. Following the most common way to 
measure spread; this study calculates spread on 
a percentage of the bid-ask midpoint. For the 
empirical estimation, we define the following 
variable for each stock: 
 Bid-ask spread = the difference between 
the lowest ask price and the highest bid 
price divided by the midpoint of the quote 
(in %). 
The standard measure of depth is at the best 
quote. This study measures depth by 
calculating ask depth and bid depth. The depth 
measure is separated between ask depth and 
bid depth since the changes in depth may be 
asymmetrical. For each stock, we define the 
following variables: 
 Ask depth = the number of shares at the 
lowest ask price. 
 Bid depth = the number of shares at the 
highest bid price. 
2. Trading Activity 
This study calculates the following 
measures of trading activity on a daily basis: 
 Shares volume = the total shares of 
transaction during the day. 
 Trading frequency = the total number of 
transactions (trades) during the day. 
3. Return Volatility 
To estimate the returns’ volatility, we 
compute daily returns’ standard deviation 
based on data from each period. Returns are 
examined according to the closing prices. 
However, the volatility of the returns will be 
affected by the movement of prices between 
the bid and ask quotes. Hence, an increase in 
trade-price returns’ volatility will be expected 
in the period of during the crisis if the spread 
widens. We therefore examine the volatility of 
returns computed from closing quotation 
midpoints. For each stock in each period, we 
measure the following variables: 
 Price returns’ volatility = standard 
deviation of daily returns, where the returns 
are calculated from the closing prices. 
 Mid-quote returns’ volatility = standard 
deviation of daily returns, where the returns 
are calculated from the closing midpoints 
of ask prices and bid prices. 
Data Analysis 
1. Univariate Data Analysis 
To test whether the liquidity, trading acti-
vity, and returns’ volatility change following 
the financial crisis, we use a paired comparison 
approach. To determine the significance of the 
differences, we follow these procedures: 
1. Time-series averages of the liquidity and 
trading activity measures are calculated in 
the pre- and during crisis periods for each 
stock. To calculate the volatility measure, 
the cross-sectional statistics are determined 
directly as in step (b). 
2. The cross-sectional statistics (mean, 
standard deviation, etc.) are then calculated 
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from the time-series averages for each 
period.  
3. Finally, two statistical tests, the parametric 
paired t-test and non-parametric sign test, 
are used to test whether the changes in the 
variables from pre- (1996) to during crisis 
period (1998) are significant.  
 
The purpose of the parametric paired t-test 
is to investigate the change in mean value, 
while the non-parametric sign test focuses on 
the significance of the proportion of the stocks 
experiencing changes. Moreover, frequency 
distribution of the interested variables is 
usually skewed, and thus does not conform 
well to the normality assumption. 
2. Regression Analysis 
Next, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression to explain the determinants of the 
bid-ask spread and depth for the 1996 and 
1998 samples and to test whether the observed 
cross-sectional relationship is stable across the 
two periods.  
We follow Aitken and Frino (1996) as the 
basis for our model of the bid-ask spread with 
slight modifications. Our model specification 
is: 
Ln Liquidityj,t =  + 1 Ln Pricej,t +  
                          2 Ln Volumej,t +  
                          3 Ln Volatilityj,t        (1) 
Where: 
Liquidityj,t = the average of each liquidity 
measure (spread and depth) for stock j 
in year t (1996 or 1998). 
Pricej,t = the average daily closing shares 
price for stock j in year t. 
Volumej,t = the average daily shares volume 
for stock j in year t. 
Volatilityj,t = the standard deviation of the 
daily price returns for stock j in year t. 
 
Technically, we follow these procedures: 
a. For each spread and depth measure as 
dependent variable, we run the regression 
for both periods, before (1996) and during 
the financial crisis (1998). The objective is 
to test the significance of the relationship 
between the dependent variables and the 
independent variables in each year. 
b. Then, for comparing these two regressions 
for 1996 and 1998, we use the dummy 
variable approach (Gujarati, 1995). This 
approach has some advantages over the 
Chow test. In doing so, we pool all 
observations of 1996 (period of before the 
financial crisis) and 1998 (during crisis 
period) samples using a full set of dummy 
interaction terms for both 1996 and 1998.  
In doing the dummy variable approach, we 
develop regression as from Equation (1) for 
each of the liquidity measure: 
Ln Liquidityj,t = 1 + 1 Ln Pricej,t +  
2 Ln Volumej,t + 3 Ln Volatilityj,t +  
 2 (Dj,t) + 4 (Dj,t) Ln Pricej,t +  
5 (Dj,t) Ln Volumej,t +  
6 (Dj,t) Ln Volatilityj,t                     (2) 
 
Where, Dj,t = the dummy variable for stock 
j, which is assigned the value 0 for the period 
of before the financial crisis (t = 1996) and 1 
for the period during the financial crisis (t = 
1998). 
Pooling enables us to test whether each 
variable’s coefficients for 1996 and 1998 are 
virtually different. Specifically, this metho-
dology enables this study to examine whether 
the differences in period of before and during 
the financial crisis found in univariate data 
analysis are: 
a. Subsequent to changes of the independent 
variables over the same period. If liquidity 
differences are attributable to changes of 
the independent variables, then we shall 
observe differences across periods in the 
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variable’s mean but not in the parameter 
estimation of those variables. 
b. Due to changes in the underlying relation-
ship between liquidity measure and 
independent variables. Changes of the 
underlying relationship between liquidity 
and the determinants will appear as 
differences across periods in the parameter 
estimates for a given variable. 
c. Due to other unexplained factors. Diffe-
rences in liquidity due to unexplained 
factors will show up as differences in the 
intercepts for the two periods. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Among all common stocks listed in the 
beginning of 1996 (238 stocks), this study 
excludes 2 stocks that were delisted during the 
sample period, leaving a total of 236 stocks as 
the samples. 
Spread and Depth 
Table 2 compares the examined variables 
from the pre- to during crisis period. The 
percentage bid-ask spread increased rapidly by 
11.51 percent from 11.08 percent in 1996 to 
22.59 percent in 1998. About 86 percent of the 
samples experienced an increase in bid-ask 
spread. All test statistics, the parametric paired 
t-tests and the non-parametric sign tests, reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no change in 
bid-ask spread from 1996 to 1998. 
Ask depth and bid depth also increased 
sharply by 430,000 shares or 750 percent from 
60,000 shares in 1996 to 490,000 shares in 
1998. About 66 percent of the samples 
experienced an increase in depth. The null 
hypothesis that there is no change in depth 
from 1996 to 1998 is not substantiated using 
the parametric paired t-tests and the non-
parametric sign tests.  
The Indonesian financial crisis caused an 
increase in bid-ask spread, thereby increasing 
the cost of transaction for small investors. 
However, depth also enhanced significantly 
during the financial crisis. These results are 
consistent with the natural relation of spread 
and depth that is the greater the spread, the 
greater the depth. The findings also indicate 
that the increase of the transaction cost is 
compensated by the larger number of shares 
traded by investors. 
 
Table 2. Univariate Results 
This table shows the average percentage bid-ask spread, market depth, trading activity, and returns’ volatility 
in the period before (1996) and during (1998) the financial crisis. Also reported is the average change 
between the two periods and the percentage of stocks with increase. The t-statistic is calculated by using a 
parametric paired t-test to test the null hypothesis that the mean change is zero. The z-statistic is calculated by 
using a non-parametric sign test to test the null hypothesis that the percentage of the stocks that experienced 
an increase equals 50. 
 1996 1998 Change t-statistic 
% of stocks 
with increase 
z-statistic 
Bid-ask spread 11.08 22.59 11.51 9.43*** 85.71 10.79*** 
Ask depth 62581.66 484743.23 422161.57 3.74*** 66.67 5.03*** 
Bid depth 63617.00 525438.70 461821.70 4.30*** 66.81 5.13*** 
Shares volume 299013.81 1004841.08 705827.27 4.77*** 56.78 2.02** 
Trading frequency 27.18 41.52 14.34 3.99*** 47.46 0.72 
Price returns’ volatility 0.04 0.08 0.05 16.71*** 88.56 11.78*** 
Mid-quote returns’ 
volatility 
0.05 0.09 0.04 13.66*** 88.74 11.71*** 
 *** Significant at the 0.01 level,   ** Significant at the 0.05 level,    * Significant at the 0.10 level 
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Trading Activity 
The transaction volume increased by 
705,827 shares or 236 percent from 299,014 
shares in 1996 to 1,004,841 shares in 1998. 
The proportion of stocks that increased was 
relatively equal to those that decreased. All test 
statistics, the parametric paired t-tests and the 
non-parametric sign tests, reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no change in volume 
from 1996 to 1998. 
For the number of trades, a similar pattern 
emerged. The average increase in the trading 
frequency was 14 per day from 27 in 1996 to 
41 in 1998. The increase is significant at 0.01 
level using the parametric paired t-tests. 
The results suggest that the financial crisis 
did not lower the activity to transact among 
investors. It may be exciting and amazing to 
know this evidence. The possible explanation 
is that the investors are in panic condition for 
the negative expectation of the capital stocks, 
pushing their intention to get out from the 
market, and hence increasing the trading 
volume and frequency. 
Volatility 
For the same reason of the panic investors, 
the evidence from the returns’ volatility shows 
the expected results. The volatility of return, 
measured by both the prices and mid-quote 
returns’ volatility, increased about 100 percent 
from 1996 to 1998. The increase of volatility is 
significant at 0.01 level using the parametric 
paired t-tests and the non-parametric sign tests. 
Regression Results 
This section uses the regression analysis to 
investigate whether spread and depth are 
determined by share prices, volume, and 
volatility, and whether the determinants are 
stable from the pre- to during crisis period. 
Panel A of Table 3 presents multiple 
regression results for both 1996 and 1998. 
Each variable is statistically significant in 
elaborating 1996 spread and is significant as 
well in explaining 1998 spread. The observed 
signs are same with the empirical results of 
Aitken and Frino (1996) and the same for both 
1996 and 1998 periods. Furthermore, all 3 
combined variables explain about 75 percent 
variation in spread. The F value is highly 
significant, implying that the models as a 
whole are significant. 
Panel B of Table 3 also presents multiple 
regression results for bid depth. For ask depth, 
the result shows a similar pattern and is not 
reported. All coefficients have the predicted 
signs and the same for both 1996 and 1998. 
Each variable is statistically significant in 
explaining 1996 depth and is also significant in 
explaining 1998 depth. Moreover, all 3 
combined variables explain about 75 percent 
variation in depth as in spread. The F value is 
also highly significant, implying that the 
models as a whole are significant. 
Subsequently, Table 4 provides t-statistics 
from a test of whether the explanatory 
variables’ coefficients for 1996 are signi-
ficantly different from those for 1998. These 
statistical tests that appear in Column 3 
indicate significant changes in the coefficients 
of volume and volatility. The results suggest 
that the decline in the coefficients of volume 
and volatility, found in Table 3 for spread as 
dependent variable, are significant. Hence, the 
stable determinant is just price. The F value is 
strongly significant, implying that the overall 
coefficient variables in the models as a whole 
are significantly not stable. 
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Table 3. Regression Results: The Determinants of the Spread and Depth 
This table reports the results of the cross-sectional regression for Ln Bid-Ask Spread in 1996 and 
1998 (Panel A) and Ln Bid Depth in 1996 and 1998 (Panel B) to Ln Price, Ln Volume, and Ln 
Volatility. 
 1996 1998 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Panel A: Ln Bid-Ask Spread 
Intercept 10.62 22.28*** 8.71 29.59*** 
Ln Price -0.39 -7.73*** -0.41 -11.55*** 
Ln Volume -0.40 -26.47*** -0.26 -19.83*** 
Ln Volatility 0.43 5.72*** 0.16 2.24** 
R Square 0.77  0.72  
F-value 257.45  197.82  
Panel B: Ln Bid-Depth 
Intercept 6.90 11.75*** 7.93 12.70*** 
Ln Price -0.39 -6.17*** -0.55 -7.39*** 
Ln Volume 0.45 23.94*** 0.54 19.14*** 
Ln Volatility -0.44 -5.02*** -0.30 -2.00** 
R Square 0.75  0.77  
F-value 224.06  250.220  
 *** Significant at the 0.01 level 
   ** Significant at the 0.05 level 
     * Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
Table 4. Regression Results: The Stability of the Coefficients 
This table reports the results of the cross-sectional regression for Ln Bid-Ask Spread and Ln Bid 
Depth to Ln Price, Ln Volume, Ln Volatility, Dummy (0 for 1996 or 1 for 1998), (Dummy) (Ln 
Price), (Dummy) (Ln Volume), and (Dummy) (Ln Volatility). 
 Ln Bid-Ask Spread Ln Bid-Depth 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 10.62 23.21*** 6.90 8.99*** 
Ln Price -0.39 -8.05*** -0.39 -4.72*** 
Ln Volume -0.40 -27.58*** 0.45 18.32*** 
Ln Volatility 0.43 5.96*** -0.44 -3.85*** 
Dummy -1.90 -3.46*** 1.03 1.11 
(Dummy) (Ln Price) -0.02 -0.25 -0.16 -1.57 
(Dummy) (Ln Volume) 0.14 6.84*** 0.09 2.67*** 
(Dummy) (Ln Volatility) -0.28 -2.68*** 0.14 0.85 
R square 0.80  0.78  
F value 257.25  227.18  
 *** Significant at the 0.01 level 
   ** Significant at the 0.05 level 
     * Significant at the 0.10 level 
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In Column 5 of Table 4, the statistical tests 
of interaction variables indicate significant 
changes in the coefficients of volume for depth 
as dependent variable. Coefficient of price is 
also stable, similar with that is found in spread 
as dependent variable. Once again, the F value 
is highly significant, implying that the overall 
coefficient variables in the models as a whole 
are significantly not stable. 
In overall, these findings suggest that 
spread and depth can remain to be elaborated 
by price, volume, and volatility and that the 
determinants of spread and depth are not stable 
from 1996 to 1998. The determinant that does 
not change is primarily the prices of shares. It 
is the impact of the financial crisis that changes 
the coefficients of the independent variables.  
CONCLUSIONS 
 This study uses daily data from the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange to examine the impact of the 
financial crisis on the stocks’ behavior. The 
crisis resulted an increase in bid-ask spread, 
thereby increasing the cost of transaction for 
small investors. However, depth also increased 
substantially during the crisis. The crisis led 
the investors to panic situation, accordingly 
increasing the trading activity and volatility of 
the traded stocks. The findings also show that 
the determinants of both spread and depth are 
price, volume, and volatility for 1996 and 
1998. However, these determinants are not 
stable from 1996 to 1998, with one exception 
of the prices of shares. 
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